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Article
Introduction
Well-functioning domestic and international agricultural com-
modity price transmissions play an important role for efficient 
resource allocation and economic growth. Slow and imperfect 
price transmissions leave producers and consumers to make 
decisions based on prices that do not reflect their real social 
costs and benefits, leading to slow economic growth (World 
Bank, 2012b). An understanding of spatial market integration 
is important to formulate good economic policies (Dutoit, 
Villafuerte, & Urrutia, 2009; Moser, Barrett, & Minten, 2009; 
Varela, Aldaz-Carroll, & Iacovone, 2012). Spatial market inte-
gration refers to both short-term comovements and long-run 
relationships among prices. It is defined as the smooth trans-
mission of price signals and information across geographically 
separated markets (Goletti, Ahmed, & Farid, 1995). Market 
integration can also be defined as a measure of the extent to 
which demand and supply in one location are transmitted to 
another (Negassa, Meyers, & Maldhin, 2003). Price differ-
ences beyond what can be explained by transportation and 
transaction costs indicate inefficient arbitrage and possibly the 
existence of market power. If markets are not well integrated, 
this often reflects the presence of infrastructural and institu-
tional bottlenecks that interfere with the efficient flow of 
goods and prices between markets (Goletti & Babu, 1994).
Investigating price transmission from the international to 
the domestic market, and integration among domestic mar-
kets within a country helps governments in formulating 
effective polices regarding investments in infrastructure and 
decisions aimed at improved food security and reduced pov-
erty. Regional and international price differences and spatial 
price dynamics provide important information for public 
market regulation and intervention, as well as information to 
producers and consumers when making decisions regarding 
resource allocation. Weak market integration may convey 
incorrect signals to both producers and consumers (Alexander 
& Wyeth, 1994; Dawe, 2008; Dutoit et al., 2009; Varela 
et al., 2012).
Rice is the basic staple food for about half of the world’s 
population. International trade in rice is thin, with only about 
5% to 7% of total world production being traded globally 
(Childs & Baldwin, 2010; Razzaque & Laurent, 2006; “Rice: 
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Asia’s Rice Bowls,” 2011). In Asia, domestic policies basi-
cally ensure self-sufficiency in many countries. The major 
exporters of milled rice include Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, 
India, China, the United States, and Italy. However, two 
exceptional rice trading nations are Pakistan and Thailand 
due to their low domestic consumption, which is less than 
50% of their total production (Childs & Baldwin, 2010).
The thin nature of the world rice market may generate 
local price patterns and excessive local volatility. Protectionist 
trade policies such as regulated prices, procurement and gov-
ernment storage, import tariffs, export subsidies, and export 
taxes adopted by importers and exporters of rice may 
strengthen price hikes and volatility in rice markets (Childs 
& Baldwin, 2010; Razzaque & Laurent, 2006; “Rice: Asia’s 
Rice Bowls,” 2011; Wailes, 2005).
Rice is an important food and cash crop within Pakistan’s 
agricultural industry, being the second largest staple food 
crop after wheat and the second largest export item after cot-
ton and cotton products (Government of Pakistan [GoP], 
2011). Pakistan ranks 12th in paddy rice production and 4th 
in milled rice exports in the world. Paddy rice contributes 
1.3% to world production, and exports of milled rice account 
for 10.9% of total world rice exports (United Nations, Food 
and Agriculture Organization [UNFAO], 2010). Two main 
varieties of rice, International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) 
and Basmati, are produced. In this study, we use monthly 
prices in the major IRRI rice markets in Pakistan, whereas 
the free on Board (FOB) price of Thai 5% broken rice (a 
close substitute for IRRI rice) is used as an international 
benchmark price1 to test the level of market integration 
between domestic and international markets. In addition to 
export prices for Pakistan, export prices from Thailand and 
Vietnam are used to analyze international market integration. 
Both Thai and Vietnam rice prices have been major interna-
tional benchmarks. Earlier studies such as Mushtaq, Abbas, 
Abedullah, and Ghafoor (2006) and Ghafoor and Aslam 
(2012) focused mainly on the market for Basmati rice in 
Punjab province. The present study uses the price of IRRI 
rice—a species with higher yields, production, and exports—
to analyze the effects of the support price policy that was 
ended in 2002, export subsidies between 2002-2003 and 
2003-2004, and minimum export price policies in 2008, and 
a comparison of market integration before and after 2002.
An Overview of the Rice Sector in 
Pakistan
Pakistan being a developing country with an agro-based 
economy has 42% of its labor force working in agriculture, 
which accounts for 23% of its gross domestic product (GDP). 
Rice production covers about 20% of the total cropped area 
for food grain production in the country.2 It accounts for 
almost 6% of the value added in agriculture and contributes 
1.3% of GDP. About 40% to 50% of the rice produced in 
Pakistan is exported because of the relatively low annual per 
capita domestic consumption of about 10 kg (Anwar, 2004; 
GoP, 2011). This also explains higher exports of IRRI rice 
compared with Basmati rice, as consumption of Basmati rice 
is higher than that of IRRI rice. The marketing chain is com-
posed of domestic producers, village dealers, commission 
agents, wholesalers, retailers, processors, and exporters 
before reaching domestic and international consumers.
Punjab province is a major producer of Basmati rice, 
whereas Sindh province is a major producer of IRRI rice. 
There was no Basmati production in Sindh province until 
2008, and only a very small area was allocated subsequently. 
Although the area under total rice cultivation has varied by 
25%—between 2.1 and 2.6 million hectares—production 
nearly doubled between 1994 and 2011, reaching 7.1 million 
tons. The area under basmati rice cultivation varied between 
1.3 and 1.7 million hectares, while production of Basmati 
rice fluctuated between 1.2 and 3.1 million tons. The area 
under cultivation and the production of IRRI rice ranged 
between 0.62 and 0.92 million hectares, and between 0.3 and 
3.0 million tons, respectively. Despite the lower area under 
IRRI rice cultivation, its production remained higher than 
Basmati because of its high yield per hectare. The average 
yield of IRRI and Basmati production was 2,468 and 1,208 
kg per hectare, respectively, from 1993 to 1996; yet it was 
2,931 and 1,737 kg per hectare from 2008 to 2011. During 
2001-2011, total exports of rice varied between 1.58 and 
4.18 million tons, with Basmati and non-Basmati (mainly 
IRRI6 and IRRI9)3 exports varying between 0.55 and 1.17 
million tons and 1.01 and 3.15 million tons, respectively. In 
the latter period, exports of non-Basmati rice varieties were 
greater than that of Basmati rice, which reflects the increas-
ing importance of IRRI rice for export. During the crisis 
period 2007-2008, exports for both varieties decreased, pos-
sibly because of the minimum export price policy during this 
period. However; after the crisis period and the withdrawal 
of the policy, exports of both varieties increased, with a 
larger increase seen for non-Basmati rice exports, indicating 
a greater responsiveness of non-Basmati rice exports to 
increased prices during the crisis period. As a result of the 
decrease in prices in 2009-2010, exports of non-Basmati rice 
decreased again (GoP, 2012; UNFAO, 2010).
A wide range of government policies and regulations influ-
encing the rice markets have been enacted in Pakistan. Still, the 
interventions in many cases have been temporary, or they have 
not been implemented to an extent that has had strong effects 
on economic behavior. For example, there have been restric-
tions on the movement of rice across regions within Pakistan 
and bans on the production of certain varieties and sowing in 
certain areas to reclaim saline lands. Price supports and govern-
ment procurement programs existed until 2001-2002. After 
2002, the government’s role has been limited to the occasional 
and irregular announcement of an indicative support price 
(Salam, 2009). This essentially is to create a price floor during 
the post-harvest period when supply is abundant, but it does not 
replace market-determined prices. The intention is to correct 
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shortcomings in the marketing system (Anwar, 2004). In 1987-
1988, the government allowed the private sector to export rice, 
which gave rise to the Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan 
(REAP; 2010), formed in 1988-1989 by private exporters. 
During the study period, no export taxes were imposed; how-
ever, an export subsidy was provided in 2 years, 2002-2003 and 
2003-2004 (World Trade Organization [WTO], 2011). 
However, on account of the high international prices in 2007-
2008, the government fixed the minimum export prices in April 
2008, but this was abolished by October 2008 (Salam, 2009). 
Import tariffs on rice were in effect but were reduced from 15% 
to 10% on an most favored nation (MFN) basis in 1999. 
Exchange rate policies include a managed float since 1982 and 
multiple exchange rate regimes in 1998 after the nuclear tests. 
Since 2000, the current flexible exchange rate system has been 
in place (Hyder & Mahboob, 2006).
Domestic and International Rice Prices 
1994-2011
In this study, we have included prices from six regions in 
Pakistan, which are Sukhar, Hyderabad, Multan, Rawalpindi, 
Peshawar, and Hyderabad (see the map in the appendix). 
Among the selected markets for the present study, Peshawar 
and Quetta are the provincial capitals of Khyber Pakhtoonkhan 
and Baluchistan provinces, respectively, while Rawalpindi is 
the neighbor city of the provincial capital of Punjab, 
Islamabad. Hyderabad is located close to Karachi, the provin-
cial capital of Sindh and a port city. Sukhar is located in Sindh 
province close to Hyderabad and also to Multan, close to the 
border between Sindh and Punjab provinces. Hyderabad and 
Sukhar are located closer to the major production regions, 
with populations of about 10.4 and 0.40 million, respectively. 
Multan is close to Sukhar and has a population of about 1.55 
million. Quetta and Peshawar are more remote from the pro-
duction regions, with populations of about 0.84 and 1.3 mil-
lion, respectively; however, Peshawar is situated close to the 
border of Afghanistan, while Quetta is located close to the 
borders of Iran and Afghanistan. Both countries are among 
the largest markets for rice exports from Pakistan. Rawalpindi 
has about 1.83 million inhabitants and lies between Multan 
and Peshawar but is closer to Peshawar.
The monthly prices of rice in the international market are 
represented by Thai (FOB) 5% broken long grain white rice. 
Just like IRRI, this is a coarse grain, and the two are close 
substitutes. The Thai price and an average price of six domes-
tic regions of Pakistan are plotted in Figure 1. Price fluctua-
tions are evident, along with a declining price trend during 
the period 1995-2001 followed by rising prices and a sharp 
increase in price during the international food crisis in 2007-
2008. Domestic prices are lower than international prices as 
transportation costs are not included in domestic prices. 
Quality differences can be another reason as they are close 
but not perfect substitutes. Low domestic prices represent an 
incentive and potential to export. However, our main con-
cern is to study the comovement of prices in the domestic 
and international markets and to examine whether the 
changes in the international markets are being transmitted to 
the domestic markets.
Data and Method
The data for Thai 5% broken white rice in U.S. dollars for the 
period January 1994 to April 2011 are taken from the World 
Bank pink sheet (World Bank, 2012a), while the data for 
prices of IRRI rice in Pakistan’s domestic markets are taken 
from agricultural statistics of Pakistan (GoP, 2012). Domestic 
prices are converted to U.S. dollars using monthly exchange 
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Figure 1. Rice prices in the international and domestic markets of Pakistan (USD per ton).
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rates from Oanda (2012). Prices of IRRI rice and Thai 5% 
are taken to test the market integration between domestic and 
international markets as both are coarse varieties and are 
close substitutes. The data for FOB prices of Pakistan, 
Thailand and Vietnam 25% broken rice are taken from vari-
ous monthly issues of Rice Market Monitor published by the 
UNFAO (2013) for the period 2006-2013. These prices are 
taken to test the integration among the international markets 
as they are all coarse varieties with 25% broken contents and 
are close substitute.
Cointegration analysis is a standard approach in studies of 
market integration. Following the approach of many studies 
of spatial integration, we apply the Augmented Dickey–Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips–Perron (PP) unit-root tests to test the sta-
tionary of the data. All the price series are found to be non-
stationary in levels in log form and stationary in first 
differences, allowing for the testing of cointegration among 
the price series. We apply the Johansen methodology 
(Johansen & Juselius, 1990) estimating the trace and maxi-
mum eigenvalues to test for cointegration among the prices 
series. The Engle and Granger (1987) two-step procedure 
(hereafter EG) is also used to test for cointegration. As men-
tioned above, there was a fundamental change in Pakistan’s 
agricultural and trade policy after 2002 when the support 
policy was terminated and a minimum export price policy 
was implemented in 2008. Such policy shifts may represent 
structural breaks in the time series and as such, generate sub-
stantial econometric challenges when conducting cointegra-
tion analysis. Specifically, a structural break may affect the 
power of cointegration tests (see, for example, Campos, 
Ericsson, & Hendry, 1996). A number of econometric 
approaches have been presented to handle structural breaks in 
the times series (e.g., Franses, 2001; Johansen, Moscow, & 
Nilesen, 2000). Instead of applying such rather complicated 
methods, we have taken a more simplistic approach. Thus, to 
analyze the effects of the support policy that was ended in 
2002 and the export policies that were adopted after 2002, the 
sample is divided into two sub-periods, before and after 2002. 
This approach enables us to study directly whether the policy 
change had an effect on market integration.
Vector error correction models (VECMs) are estimated if 
the series are cointegrated. The general form of the VECM is 
as follows:
∆ Γ ∆P P Pt i t i
i
k
t k t
k
= + + +−
=
−
−∑ ∏µ ε
1
1
,  (1)
where Pt  denotes n  × 1 vector of prices; ∆ is a first differ-
ence operator, such that ∆P P Pt t t= − −1 , Γi  with 
i k= −1 1, ,  as the short-run coefficient; ∏ αβ= ’  is a long-
run impact matrix summarizing all the long-run information 
in Pt  process, in which α  and β  are n r×  matrices of full 
column rank; the matrix β  contains cointegrating vectors 
and the matrix α  is the matrix of the adjustment coefficients 
to the long-run disequilibrium errors represented by the coin-
tegrating relations; εt  represents an i.i.d error term; and µ is 
an intercept.
Previous Studies on Market Integration
There is a large body of literature on commodity market 
integration, including a number of studies focusing on 
markets in developing countries. Silvapulle and Jayasuriya 
(1994) found integration among domestic rice markets in 
the Philippines, while Dawson and Dey (2002) found 
highly integrated rice markets in Bangladesh. Van Tilburg, 
Kuiper, and Swinkels (2008) tested law of one price for 
potato markets in Bhutan using three auction prices. They 
found integration during 1996-2000 while market imper-
fections existed for the period 2002-2005. Munir, 
Sureshwaran, Selassie, and Nyankori (1997) found market 
integration among all the selected markets of vegetables 
in Indonesia. Kaur, Arshad, and Tan (2010) found market 
integration in the broiler sector in Malaysia although 
structural rigidities were present. Nga (2009) found inte-
gration among 9 out of 34 rice markets in Vietnam, while 
Ghosh (2010) found integration of grain markets within 
and across different states in India. Acharya, Ramesh, 
Birthal, Kumar, and Negi (2012) found integration among 
most domestic rice and wheat markets in India. Mushtaq 
and Dawson (2002) applied Johansen’s test and the VECM 
methodology to measure the acreage response of agricul-
tural commodities in Pakistan. Asche, Gjølberg, and 
Guttormsen (2012) used Johansen’s test to test the central 
market hypothesis in the Sorghum markets of Tanzania. 
Acharya et al. (2012) applied cointegration and VECM 
techniques to measure market integration in the rice and 
wheat markets of India. Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) 
used Johansen’s methodology to test the market integra-
tion of rice in the domestic markets of the Philippines. 
Minot (2011) applied cointegration and error correction 
techniques to investigate the effects of changes in the 
world food markets on the staple foods of Sub-Saharan 
Africa using the small-country assumption. Greb, Jamora, 
Mengel, von Cramon-Taubadel, and Würriehausen (2012) 
studied colinks among domestic markets of agricultural 
commodities in developing countries with those among 
international markets, using cointegration and error cor-
rection techniques.
Among the studies on integration of domestic markets 
with international markets, Conforti (2004) investigated 
price transmission for a number of agricultural commodities 
for 16 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America using 
autoregressive distributed lag models and cointegration tests. 
He found relatively incomplete transmission in African mar-
kets relative to that in Asian and Latin American markets. 
For Pakistan, he used annual data for some of the major crops 
and animal products such as meat. He found a long-run rela-
tionship between the domestic price and the world reference 
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price for wheat, rice, maize, and bovine meat; however, coin-
tegration tests did not confirm the results for the latter. He 
also found a long-run relationship between export prices of 
Basmati rice and domestic wholesale prices of IRRI rice. 
Sanogo and Amadou (2010) found that prices of coarse rice 
in Nepal responded to shocks originating in India. Minot 
(2011) found long-run relationships with the world food 
prices for only 13 out of 62 domestic markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Rice prices are more closely related to international 
market prices than are maize prices. John (2013) found that 
Thai rice export price shocks are transmitted into the domes-
tic markets of Thailand, although the causality tests between 
export and domestic prices were not clear possibly because 
domestic pricing policies were in place.
Market integration studies were also conducted to ana-
lyze the policy effects. Among others, Ghosh (2011) inves-
tigated the effects of agricultural policy reforms on spatial 
market integration of food grain markets in India. He found 
that policy reforms contributed to improvement of spatial 
market integration in the post-reform period as segmented 
or poorly integrated markets in the pre-reforms period 
were strongly integrated in the post-reform period. Sekhar 
(2012) found market integration among those agricultural 
markets of India that did not face restrictions on interstate 
or interregional trade such as chick-peas and edible oils. 
He added that rice markets were not integrated at the 
national level because of restrictions on interstate trade. 
Chand (2008) found that the price spike in 2007-2008 was 
not transmitted to the domestic markets of India because of 
policy intervention by the Indian government (Acharya 
et al., 2012). Nga (2009), however, found integration 
among the rice export prices in Vietnam and Thailand, and 
that removal of export quotas did not have a significant 
effect on the relationship between prices in these two 
countries. Dorosh and Rashid (2013) found that before the 
crisis in 2007, domestic prices in Bangladesh were cointe-
grated with subsidized import parity prices; however, after 
mid-2007, prices in Bangladesh increased because of the 
restrictive export policies of India, which is one of the big-
gest import markets for Bangladesh. John (2013) con-
cluded that Thailand’s domestic price policies are not 
creating large distorting effects on world rice markets.
Econometric Results
The results for the ADF and PP unit-root tests are presented 
in Table 1. The hypothesis that the log prices contain a unit 
root could not be rejected at the 5% level of significance, 
indicating that all the prices are non-stationary except the 
Vietnam 25% price, which is stationary at the 5% level of 
significance according to ADF test, but non-stationary 
according to the PP test. The ADF test statistic of −2.91 is 
very close to the 5% critical value of −2.89. However, taking 
the first differences of the logs of prices, the unit-root hypoth-
esis is clearly rejected. These tests were also applied by 
including a trend term, but the stationarity results remain 
unchanged. So, all the prices series are I (1), permitting an 
analysis of cointegration among the prices obtained in the 
different markets.
In this study, pairwise market integration among 
Pakistan’s domestic markets is tested using the Johansen 
and EG methodologies. Lag selection was made using the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian 
information criteria (SBIC), and/or Hannen–Quim infor-
mation criteria (HQIC) selection criteria for Johansen tests 
while four lags were selected for EG tests. Using Johansen’s 
Table 1. Unit-Root Tests 1994-2011.
Variables
Log levels First differences
ADF PP ADF PP
No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend No trend
Thailand 5% −1.15 −1.70 −1.27 −1.98 −7.06 −2.88
Average domestic price −0.88 −1.71 −0.48 −1.32 −6.65 −9.00
Domestic markets
 Hyderabad −0.45 −2.82 −0.30 −2.50 −7.39 −10.39
 Sukhar −0.52 −2.35 −0.46 −2.31 −8.08 −13.26
 Multan −0.83 −2.40 −0.77 −2.22 −7.32 −9.97
 Rawalpindi −0.59 −2.27 −0.48 −2.03 −7.31 −9.33
 Peshawar −0.56 −1.73 −0.43 −1.60 −7.10 −10.89
 Quetta −0.31 −1.88 −0.03 −1.43 −7.34 −12.14
 Thailand’s 25% −2.02 −2.99 −1.45 −1.91 −5.26 −5.31
 Vietnam’s 25% −2.91 −3.31 −2.03 −2.04 −5.32 −5.41
 Pakistan’s 25% −2.40 −2.98 −1.69 −1.86 −5.29 −5.29
 Critical values (5%) −2.89 −3.45 −2.89 −3.45 −2.89 −2.89
Note. ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller; PP = Phillips–Perron.
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method (Table 2), we find all the pairs to be cointegrated 
except for Hyderabad–Peshawar and Hyderabad–Quetta. 
Applying the EG test (Table 3), we find that the Hyderabad–
Peshawar, Hyderabad–Rawalpindi, and Hyderabad–Multan 
pairs are not cointegrated (indicated with bold formatting). 
No cointegration indicates that price signals are not trans-
mitted efficiently from one market to another, possibly 
resulting in non-optimal decisions among producers, con-
sumers, and inventory holders. Moreover, marketing mar-
gins are likely to be higher than in other markets as the 
absence of cointegration can be exploited by traders. The 
possible absence of cointegration and inefficient flow of 
information between Hyderabad and Peshawar/Quetta may 
reflect the distance between these markets, situated in 
three different provinces and having the greatest distance 
among the sample markets. The result may also reflect low 
levels of trade and poor infrastructure. Government invest-
ment, particularly in infrastructure and transportation, in 
markets that are not integrated might help to integrate 
these markets.
The results from our Johansen cointegration and EG tests 
are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The results 
Table 2. Johansen’s Test for Cointegration 1994-2011.
Markets Null Alternative Trace 5% CV Maximum eigenvalues 5% CV
All International Rice 
Research Institute 
rice markets
r = 0 r ≥ 1 183.42 39.37 74.95 94.15
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 108.47 33.46 40.13 68.52
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 68.35 27.07 33.24 47.21
r ≤ 3 r ≥ 4 35.10 20.97 25.68 29.68
r ≤ 4 r ≥ 5 9.42 14.07 9.29 15.41
r ≤ 5 r ≥ 6 0.13 3.76 0.13 3.76
Markets Null Alternative Trace Maximum eigenvalues  
Hyderabad–Sukhar r = 0 r ≥ 1 20.70 20.68  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.04 0.04  
Hyderabad–Multan r = 0 r ≥ 1 16.60 16.44  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.16 0.16  
Hyderabad–Rawalpindi r = 0 r ≥ 1 15.51 15.35  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.16 0.16  
Hyderabad–Peshawar r = 0 r ≥ 1 11.62 11.53  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.09 0.09  
Hyderabad–Quetta r = 0 r ≥ 1 13.98 13.96  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.10 0.01  
Sukhar–Multan r = 0 r ≥ 1 31.72 31.21  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.50 0.50  
Sukhar–Rawalpindi r = 0 r ≥ 1 40.02 39.77  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.25 0.25  
Sukhar–Peshawar r = 0 r ≥ 1 23.87 23.61  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.26 0.26  
Sukhar–Quetta r = 0 r ≥ 1 38.79 38.75  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.04 0.04  
Multan–Rawalpindi r = 0 r ≥ 1 37.49 36.91  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.57 0.57  
Multan–Peshawar r = 0 r ≥ 1 35.05 34.55  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.49 0.49  
Multan–Quetta r = 0 r ≥ 1 61.64 61.48  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.15 0.15  
Rawalpindi–Peshawar r = 0 r ≥ 1 35.77 35.38  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.38 0.38  
Rawalpindi–Quetta r = 0 r ≥ 1 48.53 48.36  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.17 0.17  
Peshawar–Quetta r = 0 r ≥ 1 44.63 44.45  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.18 0.18  
Critical values (5%) r = 0 r ≥ 1 15.41 14.07  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 3.76 3.76  
Note. CV = Critical Values
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indicate that a long-run cointegration relationship exists 
between the prices. The trace and maximum eigenvalue statis-
tics are greater than their respective critical values, suggesting 
that all six domestic markets are integrated with the interna-
tional market and that there is one cointegrating vector in 
each pair of domestic markets and the international market. 
The results also show that the average prices of rice in the 
domestic markets of Pakistan and the price of Thai 5% bro-
ken rice are also cointegrated. The ADF results for the EG 
tests show that all domestic prices including their average are 
integrated with the Thai 5% prices except for prices in 
Hyderabad and Sukhar markets.
The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics for Thai and 
Viet 25% broken rice show that these export prices are inte-
grated, while the results of the EG test indicate that these mar-
kets are not integrated. Both the Johansen and EG tests find that 
Pak and Viet 25% export prices are cointegrated, whereas results 
for Pak and Thai 25% are mixed. According to the trace statis-
tics, these markets are integrated, whereas the maximum eigen-
value statistics and EG tests show that they are not integrated.
As described in “An Overview of the Rice Sector in 
Pakistan” section of this article, there was a policy change in 
2001-2002, when the support price policy was terminated. 
Moreover, after 2002, export subsidies were granted to rice 
exporters for the 2 years 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, and a 
minimum export price policy was adopted on account of the 
price spike during the so-called food crisis in 2007-2008. 
After 2002, the government’s role was limited to the occa-
sional and irregular announcement of an indicative support 
price (Salam, 2009). The data set is divided into two parts—
that is, before and after 2002. ADF and PP unit-root tests are 
performed on both data sets, and the results are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. The results indicate that both the series are 
non-stationary at log levels and stationary after taking first 
difference of the log series suggesting that order of integra-
tion is one. Two exceptions are Hyderabad, which is station-
ary at 5% level during 2003-2011, and Peshawar, which is 
stationary at 10% in the period 1994-2002.
Table 3. Stationarity of Residuals From Pairwise Regressions 
1994-2011 (Engle–Granger Tests).
Market pairs ADF
LagsRegression residuals No trend
Hyderabad–Sukhar −3.251 4
Hyderabad–Multan −3.018 4
Hyderabad–Rawalpindi −2.610 4
Hyderabad–Peshawar −2.777 4
Quetta–Hyderabad −3.468 4
Sukhar–Multan −4.088 4
Sukhar–Rawalpindi −4.349 4
Sukhar–Peshawar −3.402 4
Quetta–Sukhar −3.989 4
Multan–Rawalpindi −5.353 4
Multan–Peshawar −5.277 4
Multan–Quetta −5.141 4
Rawalpindi–Peshawar −4.837 4
Quetta–Rawalpindi −4.321 4
Quetta–Peshawar −3.760 4
Engle and Yoo 5% critical values −3.25  
Note. ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller.
Table 4. Johansen’s Cointegration Tests for Pakistan’s Rice 
Markets With the International Market 1994-2011.
Markets Null Alternative Trace
Maximum 
eigenvalues
Average domestic 
price—Thailand
r = 0 r ≥ 1 29.91 14.07
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.92 3.76
Hyderabad–Thailand r = 0 r ≥ 1 19.69 19.04
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.65 0.65
Sukhar–Thailand r = 0 r ≥ 1 23.74 22.49
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.25 1.25
Multan–Thailand r = 0 r ≥ 1 34.68 32.27
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 2.41 2.41
Rawalpindi–Thailand r = 0 r ≥ 1 36.90 35.20
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.70 1.70
Peshawar–Thailand r = 0 r ≥ 1 36.27 35.09
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.17 1.17
Quetta–Thailand r = 0 r ≥ 1 35.39 35.38
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.02 0.02
Viet–Thai 25% r = 0 r ≥ 1 17.98 15.88
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 2.09 2.09
Pak–Thai 25% r = 0 r ≥ 1 15.92 11.46
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 4.45 4.45
Pak–Viet 25% r = 0 r ≥ 1 29.55 23.99
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 5.56 5.56
Critical values 5% r = 0 r ≥ 1 15.41 14.07
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 3.76 3.76
Table 5. Stationarity of Residuals for Pakistan and International 
Markets (Engle–Granger Tests) 1994-2011.
Market pairs
ADF LagsRegression residuals
Average domestic price −3.638 4
Hyderabad–Thailand −2.778 4
Sukhar–Thailand −2.734 4
Multan–Thailand −3.765 4
Rawalpindi–Thailand −3.523 4
Peshawar–Thailand −4.068 4
Quetta–Thailand −3.638 4
Thai–Viet 25 −2.522 4
Pak–Thai 25 −2.634 4
Pak–Viet 25 −4.564 4
Engle and Yoo 5% critical values −3.25  
Note. Bold values represents the market pairs which are not integrated. 
ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller.
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Table 6. Unit-Root Tests 1994-2002.
Variables
Log levels First differences
ADF PP ADF PP
No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend No trend
Thailand 5% −0.83 −2.32 −1.38 −2.06 −8.03 −7.87
Average domestic price −1.32 −2.73 −1.12 −2.36 −6.29 −6.30
Domestic markets
 Hyderabad −1.83 −2.86 −1.58 −2.34 −8.40 −8.52
 Sukhar −1.62 −2.35 −1.61 −2.21 −7.65 −7.47
 Multan −1.92 −3.00 −1.81 −2.71 −6.29 −6.16
 Rawalpindi −1.50 −2.62 −1.45 −2.45 −7.16 −7.01
 Peshawar −1.39 −3.30 −1.23 −2.78 −7.62 −7.59
 Quetta −1.28 −2.45 −1.19 −2.29 −6.62 −6.49
 Critical values (5%) −2.890 −3.451 −2.89 −3.45 −2.89 −2.89
Note. ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller; PP = Phillips–Perron.
Table 7. Unit-Root Tests 2003-2011.
Variables
Log levels First differences
ADF PP ADF PP
No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend No trend
Thailand 5% −1.57 −2.33 −1.43 −2.03 −5.96 −5.91
Average domestic price −1.48 −2.63 −1.29 −2.07 −6.37 −6.42
Domestic markets
 Hyderabad −2.12 −3.77 −1.95 −3.15 −6.77 −6.73
 Sukhar −1.62 −2.69 −1.63 −2.64 −9.67 −9.67
 Multan −1.67 −2.70 −1.61 −2.43 −7.07 −7.04
 Rawalpindi −1.67 −2.80 −1.54 −2.46 −6.03 −6.01
 Peshawar −1.37 −1.92 −1.32 −1.84 −7.68 −7.62
 Quetta −1.00 −2.55 −0.89 −2.34 −9.75 −9.74
 Critical values (5%) −2.89 −3.45 −2.891 −3.451 −2.89 −2.89
Note. ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller; PP = Phillips–Perron.
The Johansen and EG tests were used to test for cointegra-
tion among pairs of domestic markets as well as the interna-
tional market. The ADF stationarity test results (Table 8) for 
the EG test reveal that 10 market pairs were not integrated 
until 2002, whereas the number of non-integrated market pairs 
falls from 10 to 8 after 2002. This indicates that the degree of 
cointegration among the domestic markets increased after the 
termination of the support price policy. However, before 2002, 
this policy did not seem to influence the degree of cointegra-
tion of Pakistan’s domestic markets with the international 
market as almost all the markets were integrated with the 
international market. The results suggest a positive influence 
of the policy change on the functioning and degree of cointe-
gration within the domestic markets, which supports the cessa-
tion of the costly support price policy and government 
procurement. Mushtaq and Dawson (2002) recommended 
ending the support price policy for rice in Pakistan.
Both the Johansen and EG test results show that all the 
domestic rice markets were integrated with the international 
market before 2002 except for Hyderabad, which was not inte-
grated according to Johansen’s test but integrated according to 
the EG test results. Using the average domestic price as a proxy 
for Pakistan’s rice market, we also find Pakistan to be integrated 
with the international market before 2002. However, both tests 
show that the degree of market integration with the international 
market decreased after 2002 as Sukhar and Multan were no lon-
ger integrated according to the Johansen test results (Table 9), 
whereas all the markets were no longer integrated according to 
EG results (Table 10). Moreover, both of the test results show 
that average domestic prices were not cointegrated with the 
international reference price after 2002. The export subsidy 
policies adopted by Pakistan during the period 2002-2004 and 
the minimum export price policy in 2008 may have caused this 
decrease in the degree of integration.
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The pairwise VECM estimates using the maximum 
likelihood method for those domestic markets found to be 
cointegrated are reported in Table 11. Lag selection was 
made using the AIC, SBIC, and/or HQIC selection crite-
ria, which suggested the lag order of two. Langrangian–
Multiplier (LM) test was applied to test autocorrelation 
between the VECM residuals. The results accept the 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation at 5% level of signifi-
cance in most of the market pairs except Quetta–
Rawalpindi, Quetta–Sukhar, and Quetta–Peshawar; 
however, autocorrelation does not exist at Lag 1. As the 
estimations for all other market pairs are conducted at 
Lag Level 2, we did the same for these market pairs for 
getting short-run elasticities and better comparisons. 
However, there is no change in the level of significance 
of the coefficients, while their magnitude varies a little. 
The coefficients for the long-run relationships are statis-
tically significant and negative at the 1% level of signifi-
cance in all pairs. The long-run elasticity of price 
transmission ranges from 0.89 to 1.0 indicating a high 
degree of transmission of price changes from one market 
to the other in the long run. The Johansen test results for 
cointegration show that a long-run relationship exists 
among these markets. However, the degree and statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the speed of adjust-
ment vary across the pairs. For most of the pairs, the 
coefficients on the speed of adjustment are statistically 
significant at the 1% or 5% level of significance, except 
for Multan–Quetta, which is significant only at the 10% 
level of significance. These coefficients have the expected 
signs, indicating that prices converge. However, there are 
two exceptions, Rawalpindi–Quetta and Peshawar–Quetta, 
whose coefficients are not statistically significant. In con-
trast, the coefficients of Quetta–Rawalpindi and Quetta–
Peshawar are statistically significant, implying that prices 
in the Quetta markets adjust to correct any disequilibrium 
between these pairs. The values of the coefficients of 
short-run adjustment are all small, varying from 0.02 to 
0.22. The pairs including Hyderabad have the lowest 
speed of adjustment. The pairs including Rawalpindi, the 
neighboring city of Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, move 
quickly toward equilibrium with a speed of adjustment 
from 11% to 22%, except for Rawalpindi–Quetta, which 
has an insignificant coefficient as described earlier. A 
possible reason is the large distance between the two 
markets, resulting in low volumes of trade. The actual 
data on trade between these markets are not available; 
however, it can be approximated on the basis of the distance 
between the cities and from the location of the production 
regions. For instance, Quetta and Rawalpindi are both non/
very small producers and very far from each other, being 
situated on two different sides of the producing regions and 
in two different provinces.
In general, the process of adjustment toward long-run 
equilibrium appears to be slow. The estimated correction 
parameters are in the range 0.03 to 0.22 across the different 
market pairs, implying that 3% to 22% of any divergence 
from long-run equilibrium is corrected monthly. Possible 
reasons for this slow adjustment are the low level of 
domestic consumption, low volume of trade in distant mar-
ket pairs, poor infrastructure, and market power of traders. 
The coefficients on the short-run elasticity of price trans-
mission are statistically significant and have the expected 
signs in many cases, suggesting that price changes in 
recent months significantly affect current and future 
changes in the prices among these market pairs. These 
results are helpful for forming expectations of future prices 
and accordingly, decisions regarding storage and resource 
allocation. However, there are market pairs where the 
short-run price transmission elasticity coefficients are not 
significant, suggesting that past changes in prices are not 
transmitted in the short run, although there exist signifi-
cant long-run equilibrium relationships. This might be due 
to the direction of causality, distance, and infrastructure 
between them resulting in weak market integration or a 
low speed of adjustment.
The VECM’s results for the Pakistan’s domestic and 
international markets are reported in Table 12. Lag selec-
tion was made using the AIC, SBIC, and/or HQIC selec-
tion criteria, which suggested the lag order of two. LM 
test was applied to test autocorrelation between the VECM 
residuals. The results accept the hypothesis of no autocor-
relation at 5% level of significance. The coefficients on 
the speed of adjustment in domestic as well as interna-
tional markets are statistically significant at 1% or 5% 
Table 8. Stationarity of Residuals From Pairwise Regressions 
(Two-Step Procedures).
Market pairs ADF ADF
LagsRegression residuals 1994-2002 2003-2011
Hyderabad–Sukhar −2.497 −2.652 4
Hyderabad–Multan −2.332 −2.570 4
Hyderabad–Rawalpindi −2.220 −1.858 4
Hyderabad–Peshawar −2.048 −2.478 4
Quetta–Hyderabad −2.437 −3.669 4
Sukhar–Multan −2.836 −4.102 4
Sukhar–Rawalpindi −2.893 −3.700 4
Sukhar–Peshawar −2.951 −2.965 4
Quetta–Sukhar −3.319 −2.678 4
Multan–Rawalpindi −4.972 −3.356 4
Multan–Peshawar −3.731 −4.285 4
Multan–Quetta −4.490 −3.337 4
Rawalpindi–Peshawar −2.898 −4.418 4
Quetta–Rawalpindi −4.145 −2.762 4
Quetta–Peshawar −2.970 −2.384 4
Engle and Yoo 5% critical values −3.17 −3.17  
Note. Bold values represents the market pairs which are not integrated. 
ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller.
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Table 10. Engle–Granger Test Results for Domestic and 
International Market Cointegration Before and After 2002.
Market pairs ADF ADF
LagsRegression residuals 1994-2002 2003-2011
Hyderabad–Thailand FOB −3.827 −2.906 4
Sukhar–Thailand FOB −3.558 −1.691 4
Multan–Thailand FOB −4.304 −2.423 4
Rawalpindi–Thailand FOB −3.720 −2.998 4
Peshawar–Thailand FOB −3.995 −2.835 4
Quetta–Thailand FOB −3.467 −2.637 4
Average–Thailand FOB −4.428 −2.339 4
Engle and Yoo 5% critical values −3.17 −3.17  
Note. Bold values represents the market pairs which are not integrated. 
ADF = Augmented Dickey–Fuller.
level of significance except for Peshawar. This suggests 
that both the prices adjust to deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium; however, coefficient values are very small 
ranging from 0.03 to 0.11, which suggest that process of 
adjustment is very slow. About 3% to 11% of deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium is adjusted every month. 
The possible reasons can be the infrastructure deficien-
cies, slow transportation, and trade rigidities. Our objec-
tive in this article is to examine the price transmission 
from the international markets to the domestic markets of 
Pakistan. Hence, interpretation of the results focuses on 
the results of domestic market equations in the VECM.
The VECM estimates for each of the individual domestic 
markets paired with the international market show that the coef-
ficients of the speed of adjustment in all markets are statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance, except for the 
Hyderabad market, which is significant at the 5% level of sig-
nificance. This coefficient is not significant for Peshawar. This 
implies that prices in all individual markets except Peshawar 
move toward a long-run equilibrium with the international 
market. The coefficient value in Rawalpindi, Multan, and 
Quetta markets is about 0.10. The values of these coefficients 
for Sukhar and Hyderabad, the closest markets geographically, 
are 0.07 and 0.02, respectively. The coefficient for the 
Hyderabad market is quite low despite the fact that the 
Hyderabad is not far away from Karachi from where it is easy 
to ship rice to the international markets. This reflects that 
direct trade from Sukhar to Karachi is taking place. Sukhar is 
located relatively closer to the production areas, and it makes 
a little difference to travel to Karachi or Hyderabad. The coef-
ficients on the long-run equilibrium in all the markets are sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The 
coefficient values ranges from 0.68 to 0.98, showing that in 
the long run, about 68% to 98% of changes in the international 
market are transmitted to the domestic markets of Pakistan.
The short-run elasticity of price transmission with 
respect to own lagged differenced market price and lagged 
differenced international price presents a mixed picture. 
All the short-run elasticity coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% or 5% level of significance except 
for Sukhar and Quetta. In Sukhar, its own price short-run 
coefficient is not significant, whereas in Quetta, short-run 
coefficient with respect to world’s price is not significant. 
The values on these coefficients range from 0.21 to 0.32. 
The Hyderabad market captures more of the effect of past 
changes in its own price, 32%, compared with the interna-
tional price. Only 3% of changes in the international market 
Table 9. Johansen’s Test for Cointegration.
Markets Null Alternative
1994-2002 2003-2011
Trace Maximum eigenvalues Trace Maximum eigenvalues
Hyderabad–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 14.753 13.443 20.208 16.925
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.309 1.309 3.282 3.282
Sukhar–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 25.592 24.362 12.629 9.094
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.229 1.229 3.534 3.534
Multan–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 31.605 29.851 14.941 11.339
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.754 1.754 3.602 3.602
Rawalpindi–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 32.705 31.264 18.235 14.701
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 1.440 1.440 3.535 3.535
Peshawar–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 28.04 27.24 16.209 13.824
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.804 0.804 2.385 2.385
Quetta–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 35.350 34.414 22.949 21.682
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.936 0.936 1.267 1.266
Average–Thailand FOB r = 0 r ≥ 1 36.030 35.065 13.643 11.319
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.965 0.965 2.324 2.324
Critical values r = 0 r ≥ 1 15.41 14.07 15.41 14.07
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 3.76 3.76 3.76 3.76
Note. Bold values represents the market pairs which are not integrated.
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price are transmitted within 2 months. The Sukhar market 
price does not respond significantly to past changes in its 
own price; however, about 28% of changes in the interna-
tional price are transmitted within 1 month. In Rawalpindi, 
Table 11. VECM Estimates for the Domestic (All) and International Markets During 1994-2011.
Independent variables
Dependent variable: Prices in the domestic markets
HYD–RWP RWP–HYD HYD–MTN MTN–HYD HYD–SKR
Speed of adjustment −0.06a 0.05b −0.05a 0.06b −0.06a
Long-run coefficient −0.89a −0.89a −0.89a −0.89a −0.89a
Own lagged differenced price 0.24a −0.08 0.25a −0.21a 0.3a
Other market’s lagged diff. price 0.12a 0.45a 0.11a 0.4a 0.02
Constant 0.005b 0.006c 0.006a 0.007c 0.008a
LM test 0.11 0.45 0.21
Independent variables SKR–HYD RWP–MTN MTN–RWP RWP–SKR SKR–RWP
Speed of adjustment 0.1a −0.11a 0.22a −0.11a 0.19b
Long-run coefficient −0.89a −1.00a −1.00a −1.00a −1.00a
Own lagged differenced price −0.05 0.19a −0.10 0.38a −0.11
Other market’s lagged diff. price 0.13c 0.34a 0.48a 0.10c 0.18a
Constant 0.004 0.005b 0.002 0.007b 0.004
LM test 0.81 0.32  
 RWP–PSW PSW–RWP QTA–RWP RWP–QTA MTN–SKR
Speed of adjustment −0.13a 0.12a 0.19a −0.02 −0.10a
Long-run coefficient −0.98a −0.98a 0.97a −1.00a −1.00a
Own lagged differenced price 0.34a 0.08 0.04 0.44a 0.37a
Other market’s lagged diff. price 0.35a 0.33a 0.04 −0.08 0.01
Constant 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.007b 0.007c
LM test 0.91 15.11a  
Independent Variables SKR–MTN MTN–PSW PSW–MTN QTA–MTN MTN–QTA
Speed of adjustment 0.17a −0.17a 0.09a 0.19a −0.06c
Long-run coefficient −1.00a −0.98a 0.02a −1.00a −1.00a
Own lagged differenced price 0.19b 0.33a 0.26 −0.08c 0.42a
Other market’s lagged diff. price 0.03 0.22a 0.01a 0.08 −0.13
Constant 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.009b
LM test 0.71 0.53 7.72c
Independent Variables SKR–PSW PSW–SKR SKR–QTA QTA–SKR PSW–QTA
Speed of adjustment −0.16a 0.07a −0.06 0.14a −0.02
Long-run coefficient −0.97a −0.97b −0.99a −0.99a −1.00a
Own lagged differenced price 0.06 0.02 0.11 −0.06 0.28a
Other market’s lagged diff. price 0.30a 0.26a 0.01 0.13b −0.01
Constant 0.003 0.007b 0.010b 0.004 0.008b
LM test 0.65 11.66a 16.86a
Independent variables QTA–PSW  
Speed of adjustment 0.17a  
Long-run coefficient −1.00a  
Own lagged differenced price −0.18a  
Other market’s lagged diff. price 0.17a  
Constant 0.001  
Note. VECM = vector error correction model; HYD = Hyderabad; RWP = Rawalpindi; MTN = Multan; SKR = Sukhar; PSW = Peshawar; QTA= Quetta; 
LM = Langrangian–Multiplier.
a,b,cStatistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 12. VECM Estimates for the Domestic (All) and International Markets.
Independent variables
Dependent variable: Prices in the respective markets
HYD–Thai Thai–HYD SKR–Thai Thai–SKR MTN–Thai
Speed of adjustment −0.03c 0.10a −0.07b 0.10a −0.10a
Long-run coefficient −0.68a −0.68a −0.89a −0.89a −0.90a
Domestic market’s differenced price 0.31a −0.10 0.04 −0.12b −0.28a
International market’s lagged diff. price 0.03a 0.39a 0.32a 0.43a 0.34a
Constant 0.002 0.0007 0.003 0.002 0.002
LM test 0.94 0.75 7.98c
Independent variables Thai–MTN RWP–Thai Thai–RWP PSW–Thai Thai–PSW
Speed of adjustment 0.10a −0.11a 0.12a −0.04 0.17a
Long-run coefficient −0.90a −0.90a −0.91a −0.98a −0.98a
Domestic market’s differenced price −0.09 0.19a 0.16a 0.19a 0.07
International market’s lagged diff. price 0.42a 0.34a 0.44a 0.18a −0.42
Constant 0.002 0.005b 0.001 0.003 0.0009
LM test 0.43 8.13c  
 QTA–Thai Thai–QTA  
Speed of adjustment 0.09a 0.13a  
Long-run coefficient −0.89a −0.89a  
Domestic market’s differenced price −0.15b −0.06  
International market’s lagged diff. price 0.04 0.44a  
Constant 0.003 0.002  
LM test 7.9c  
Note. VECM = vector error correction model; HYD = Hyderabad; RWP = Rawalpindi; MTN = Multan; SKR = Sukhar; PSW = Peshawar; QTA= Quetta; 
LM = Langrangian–Multiplier.
a,b,cStatistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
42% of past price changes are transmitted each month 
compared with 33% of changes in the international market 
over a month. The values for the Peshawar market are 
19% and 18% in 1 month, respectively. The coefficients 
on the short-run elasticities with respect to the interna-
tional price in the Quetta market are not significant, 
whereas with respect to its own market, it is significant. 
This shows a low responsiveness of the Quetta market to 
the international market, although it is integrated with the 
international market, and its long-run coefficient is statis-
tically significant. Low responsiveness may be due to its 
geographical location, which is far from most of the other 
major markets, small size of the market, and poor law and 
order condition. Greb et al. (2012) found that rice market 
pairs are less cointegrated than maize markets. They also 
found that domestic prices adjust to international prices 
for most agricultural commodities except rice. Contrary to 
Greb et al. (2012), we find that Pakistan’s domestic prices 
for rice adjust to the international market; however, the 
level of the adjustment is low.
The above results can be helpful in decision making 
regarding allocation of resources by producers and inven-
tory holders as well as consumers. Producers and traders 
can form forecasts of future price changes based on changes 
in prices in the current and recent past period, and can 
make their production and storage decisions accordingly. 
Producers can allocate more resources to increase produc-
tion if they expect increases in prices, and vice versa, based 
on the long-run price adjustment coefficient. Inventory 
holders can form expectations based on the short-run coef-
ficients. They will store if they expect prices to increase in 
the coming months, and vice versa. These production and 
storage decisions can affect food security.
Summary and Conclusion
In this study, we have reported econometric results on whether 
Pakistan’s rice markets are integrated domestically and with 
international markets, focusing on cointegration and the speed 
of price adjustments. We investigate the effects of the change 
in policy that took place in 2002; when Pakistan terminated its 
support price policy and subsequently introduced export poli-
cies, export subsidy, and minimum export price policy.
The results from the EG and Johansen tests strongly 
indicate that all the domestic markets are integrated, pos-
sibly excepting Hyderabad–Peshawar, Hyderabad–
Rawalpindi, Hyderabad–Multan, and Hyderabad–Quetta. 
The VECM estimates of the domestic markets reveal that 
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prices converge in the long run; however, the speed of 
adjustment toward long-run equilibrium is generally low. 
The adjustment coefficients vary from 0.02 to 0.22 across 
various pairs of markets, indicating that about 2% to 22% 
of the divergence from the long-run equilibrium is being 
corrected monthly. The long-run coefficient varies from 
0.89 to 1, revealing that about 90% to 100% of price 
changes are transmitted across different pairs of the mar-
kets in the long run. The ending of the support price policy 
seems to have resulted in an improvement in the integra-
tion of domestic markets as the number of non-integrated 
market pairs decreased after 2002.
All the domestic markets in Pakistan appear to be integrated 
with the international market possibly excepting Hyderabad 
and Sukhar, although the speed of adjustment is rather slow. 
The estimated coefficients of adjustments indicate that the 
domestic markets tend to converge with the international mar-
ket in the long run, and about 3% to 11% of the divergence 
from long-run equilibrium due to shocks in the international 
market is corrected within a month. Slow adjustment may be 
due to the existence of infrastructure deficiencies, slow 
transportation, and trade rigidities. Government should 
invest on infrastructure to improve the extend of market inte-
gration and speed up the process of adjustment toward long-
run equilibrium particularly in the province of Sindh, which is 
the main production region and possesses low quality of infra-
structure with greater room for infrastructure development. 
Government should act as watch dog and keep an eye on the 
marketing system particularly on the role of market intermedi-
aries to avoid any malpractices that can affect the smooth func-
tioning and integration of markets, which can convey the 
wrong signals to producers and can result in inefficient alloca-
tion of resources. The long-run elasticity of price transmission 
ranges from 0.68 to 0.98 across markets, suggesting that 68% 
to 98% of changes in the international price are transmitted to 
domestic prices in the long run. Among the export markets for 
rice, Pakistan’s rice markets seem to be integrated with the 
markets of Thailand and Vietnam.
The cointegration and VECM results suggest that while 
domestic markets are integrated with, and responsive to, 
changes in the international market and domestic markets, 
responsiveness to own (local) shocks is higher although 
exceptions exist. Producers and traders can form expecta-
tions of future changes in prices based on changes in 
prices in the current and last period, and can make their 
production and storage decisions accordingly.
Support price policy reforms have improved market 
integration within Pakistan; however, they do not seem to 
have affected the integration of Pakistan with the interna-
tional market, while export policies have reduced the extent 
of market integration of Pakistan with the international 
market. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that reduc-
ing government intervention in price determination would 
increase international market integration further.
Appendix
Map of Pakistan showing provinces and their capitals and selected 
markets in this study.
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Notes
1. Since 2011, the Thai rice price has no longer been used as 
an international reference price. After being elected in 2011, 
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra introduced substantial 
subsidies to Thai rice farmers, causing Thai rice prices to 
increase substantially above international prices.
2. Some further details can be found in Ahmad and Garcia 
(2012).
3. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI6) and IRRI9 coarse 
rice varieties were developed at the IRRI in the Philippines. 
IRRI9 was developed by crossing the IRRI6 and Basmati rice 
varieties.
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